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CAN GOVERNMENT AFFORD TO PROTECT OUR
NATION'S WETLANDS?: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE DECISIONS IN
LOVELADIES AND
FLORIDA ROCK
INTRODUCTION

Government protection of a natural resource is no different
than government regulation of any other area; a conflict is inherent. The conflict centers upon the government's power to regulate
versus an individual's property rights. Ideally, a balance is struck,
and the resource is allocated between public and private interests.1
Yet, there are certain cases where the natural resource is so depleted that the need to regulate tilts the balance and infringes upon
the individual's property rights. 2 When this happens, the courts require the government to pay "just compensation."3
Such is the case with the protection of our nation's wetlands.
Wetlands are areas saturated by surface or ground water which
generally include swamps, marshes, and bogs. 4 For years, wetlands
were seen only as worthless land that was ripe for development. 5
This attitude led to the loss of over half of our nation's 215 million
1. See FREDERIcK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAw AND PoLIcY at xxiii (1983) (discussing the evolution of environmental
law).
2. See Robert Meltz, FederalRegulation of the Environment and the Takings Issue, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 95, 95 (1991) (discussing the taking issue moving to the forefront as the growth of industry and the regulation of the
environment meet); see also Lynda L. Butler, State EnvironmentalPrograms:A
Study In PoliticalInfluence and Regulatory Failure,31 WM. & MARY L. REv.
823, 839 (1990) (discussing private landowners' expectation of freedom to do
what they want with their land free of government regulation).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation").
4. The Corps of Engineers defines wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b) (1991).
5. See generally Kevin O'Hagan, Pumping With the Intent to KilL"Evading Wetlands JurisdictionUnder Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Through
Draining,40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1059 (1991) (discussing the Swamp Wetlands Act
of 1850 which granted sixty-five million acres of wetlands to the states for
reclamation).
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acres of wetlands. 6 Following a period of growing environmental
awareness,7 wetlands are now recognized and regulated as valuable
natural resources. s Yet, as the wetlands are more strictly regulated,
the apparent loss of property rights becomes more prevalent. In
turn, more property owners seek protection, looking to the courts
for just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.9
In 1990, two decisions in the United States Claims Court
awarded just compensation for the regulatory taking of wetlands. 10
6. Bhavani Prasad V. Nerikar, This Wetland Is Your Land, This Wetland
Is My Land. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Its Impact on the Private
Development of Wetlands, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 197, 198 (1990) (citing U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE, WETLANDS TRENDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 3 (1984)). According to one commentator, only 99

million acres of wetlands remain in the continental United States. Id. Additionally, wetlands in the United States are lost at a rate of 300,000 to 500,000
acres a year. Jan Goldman-Carter, Clean Water Act Section 404: A Critical
Link in ProtectingOurNation's Waters, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 10 (1991).
The following is a list of the ten states with the most wetlands (in millions of
acres): Alaska 170; Florida 11; Louisiana 6.8; Minnesota 8.7; Texas 7.6; North
Carolina 5.7; Michigan 5.6; Wisconsin 5.3; Georgia 5.3; and Maine 5.2. Jean Seligman, What on Earth Is a Wetland?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1991, at 48.
7. See Nerikar, supra note 6, at 197.
8. "Most wetlands constitute a productive and valuable public resource,
the unnecessary alteration or destruction of which should be discouraged as
contrary to the public interest." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (1991).
"Wetlands are one of the most environmentally and commercially valuable
ecosystems in the world." O'Hagan, supranote 5, at 1063. Wetlands play a vital
role in flood control by absorbing overflow and helping curb erosion of stream
banks and shores. Id. Wetlands also help play a large role in maintaining our
overall water quality as they filter both organic and inorganic materials. Nerikar, supra note 6, at 207. The overall health of a wetland is an indication of
water quality in a particular area. Id
Wetlands also play a vital role in the survival of wildlife. The Office of
Technology Assessment stated:
Wetlands provide food and habitat for many game and non-game animals.
For some species, wetlands are essential for survival. For instance, many
species of waterfowl and saltwater fish require wetlands for breeding or
nesting. Approximately 20 percent of all plant and animal species listed by
the Federal Government as threatened or endangered depend heavily on
wetlands.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS THEIR: USE AND REGULATIONS 6 (1984).

Many species of plants are also unique to the wetland environment.
O'Hagan, supra note 5, at 1063. For a discussion of the importance of wetlands,
see generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED
STATES, CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 13-25 (1984).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion and the full text of the Fifth
Amendment, see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
10. A "regulatory taking," also known as "inverse condemnation," occurs
when a regulation restricting the use of property goes too far in restricting use
and in effect, takes the property from the landowner. See San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 (1981).
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The decisions in Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States31 and Florida Rock Industriesv. United States' 2 have given private landowners hope that favorable decisions and expensive judgments will lead
to an easing in the enforcement of wetlands regulations. 13 On the
other hand, environmentalists are worried that these decisions will
lead to an increase in takings litigation and the demise of our nation's dwindling wetlands. 14 Both cases are currently on appeal in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' 5 The
outcome of these two cases will have a profound impact on the protection of wetlands in the United States.
This Note will analyze the decisions in Loveladies and Florida
Rock and discuss the flaws in the Claims Court's application of the
takings analysis, which should lead to their reversal on appeal. Part
I will first discuss the permit process under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act. Part I will then present an overview of the Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution and the factors which the
Supreme Court has relied on in regulatory takings cases. Part II
will first introduce the factual and procedural backgrounds of Loveladies and FloridaRock and will then analyze the decisions and implications of the two cases. Part III will conclude by discussing how
the takings analysis applied by the Claims Court reflects a trend
toward the decrease in regulation of wetlands on private property
and, in turn, the loss of millions of acres of wetlands.
I. SECTION 404 AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
In order to analyze the decisions in Loveladies and Florida
Rock it is necessary to have an understanding of the regulatory
source of wetlands takings challenges and the constitutional considerations which form the framework for these cases. This section
11. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15,

1991).
12. 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30,

1991).
13. See The Cost of Clean Water: FloridaRock v. United States, Bus. WEEK,
July 22, 1985, at 106 (discussing how the government may find it more expensive than expected to keep U.S. waters pollution-free following the decision in

FloridaRock); Government Must Pay IfLaw Takes Land's Value, ENG'G NEWS
REc., June 20, 1985, at 43 (discussing how the federal government could face

some unexpected costs in enforcing the Clean Water Act because of successful
takings claims).
14. See Court Backs Developer In Wetlands "Taking", ENG'G NEWS REC.,
August 9, 1990, at 23 (suggesting that the ruling in Loveladies could open the
"floodgates" for many more suits against the Corps).
15. The government appealed the decisions in both Loveladies and Florida
Rock to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. In Loveladies, the government filed its appeal on February 15, 1991 (No. 91-5050) and the circuit court
heard oral arguments on October 9,1991. In FloridaRock, the government filed
its appeal on September 30, 1991 (No. 91-5156) and the circuit court heard oral
arguments on May 8, 1992.
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will disczuss how a takings case is brought under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act.16 It will also discuss rulings by the United States
Supreme Court that have addressed the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
A.

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act

The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act' 7
("NEPA") in 1969 is seen as the beginning of environmental law.'8
NEPA was also the impetus behind the passage, in 1970, of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,' 9 more often referred to as the
Clean Water Act 20 ("CWA"). The main goal of the CWA was "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity
of the Nation's water."'2 ' In 1972, the Act was amended to include
section 404,22 which established a permit program for the discharge
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-91 (1988).
18. Michael F. Reilly, TransformationAt Work:-The Effect ofEnvironmental Law On Land Use Control,24 REAL PROP., PROB.AND T. J. 33,33 n.1 (1989).
19. Id. at 33 n.2 (citing Peter M. Detwiler, EnvironmentalAnalysis After a

Decade: "If Prophecy is Impossible, Then Go For Understanding," 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 93 (1981). Congress passed a broad range of statutes aimed at environmental concerns in the wake of NEPA, in areas such as endangered species,
clean air, mining, drinking water, pesticides, occupational safety, resource recovery, federal land management, and toxins. Id.
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). The CWA lists the following as its goals and
policies:
In order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent
with the provisions of this chapter(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;

(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of
water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be
achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of pollutants in toxic
amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that the Federal financial assistance be provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment management planning processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate
control of sources of pollutants in each State;
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration
effort be made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and
the oceans; and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of
both point and nonpoint sources of pollution.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2) (1988). Section 404 states in part:
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of dredged or fill23 materials onto wetlands. Today, section 404 of
24
the Clean Water Act is the main vehicle for wetlands protection.
Section 404 is also the source of more takings claims than any other
regulatory program. 25
Congress gave the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") the role
26
Over the years,
of administering section 404's permit program.
increased. 27
significantly
has
the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands
(2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow
or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such
waters reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section.
Id.
23. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1991). The Corps and the EPA define "dredged
material" as material dredged or excavated from waters of the United States.
Id. See also 40 C.F.R § 231.2(g) (1991).
However, the EPA and the Corps differ in their definition of "fill material." The Corps' defines it as "any material used for the primary purpose of
replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a
waterbody." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1991). The EPA has replaced the "primary
purpose" requirement of the Corps definition with broader language. Its definition is "any material having the effect of replacing an aquatic area with dry land
or of changing the bottom elevation of a body of water." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
(1991). See generally LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
LAND USE, § 4.03[3][b] (1991) (discussing the Corps' and EPA's definitions of
dredged and fill materials).
Included in the activities the Corps lists as "discharge of fill material" are
the following.
[P]lacement of fill that is necessary to the construction of any structure in a
water of the United States; the building of any structure or impoundment
requiring rock, sand, dirt, or other material for its construction; site development fills for recreational, industrial, commercial, residential, and other
uses; causeways or road fill, dams and dikes; artificial islands; property protection and/or reclamation devices such as rip-rap, groins, seawalls, breakwaters, and revetments....
33 C.F.R § 323.2(f) (1991).
24. See Nerikar, supra note 6, at 200. The Section 404 program was not
designed as a program for wetlands protection, and thus has problems. In 1984,
Congress' Office of Technology Assessment identified the following problems in
the program: (1) section 404 does not regulate activities harmful to wetlands,
such as excavating, draining, and cleaning;, (2) limited resources lead to a lack
of regulatory control; and (3) the program has administrative problems such as,
the lack of coordination between the agencies involved in the program, limited
monitoring and enforcement of the regulations and inadequate public awareness. MALONE, supra note 23, § 4.11.
25. Meltz, supra note 2, 97.
26. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6) (1991). See also Garrett Power, The Fox in the
Chicken Coop: The RegulatoryProgramof the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers,63
VA. L. REV. 503 (1977) (discussing the logic behind putting the Corps, whose
main duty is to construct or excavate, in charge of an environmentally sensitive

program).

27. The Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands was originally limited to "navigable waters" under section 10 of the River and Harbors Act of 1899. See 33 U.S.C.

§§ 401-13 (1991). The Act required approval from the Corps for any excavation

or construction in "navigable waters" which until 1968 were construed to be
waters that were used for commerce. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
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Under section 404, a private landowner seeking to discharge dredge
or fill materials onto wetlands must apply to the Army Corps of
Engineers for a permit. 28
The permit process begins with the application to the Corps for
permission to discharge dredged or fill materials onto the applicant's property.2 9 The Corps then makes a determination of
whether the subject parcel of land is a "wetland."30 If the Corps
determines land is a wetland, the Corps next determines whether a
permit to discharge dredged or fill materials will be granted. 3 '
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has final veto
authority 32 over any permit approval or denial.3 3 If the permit is
In 1968, the Corps defined navigable waters as "[t]hose that are subject to the
ebb and tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be
susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce." 33 C.F.R.
§ 329.4 (1991).
The Corps redefined its jurisdiction in 1975 to encompass most of the nation's wetlands. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975). Therefore, the role of the Rivers
and Harbors Act was diminished by the broader scope of section 404. See Reilly,
supra note 18, at 66. The Supreme Court in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., upheld the expanded scope of section 404. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). The

Court ruled that freshwater wetlands adjacent to open bodies of water fell
within the scope of section 404 and within a reasonable interpretation of the
Corps' jurisdiction under section 404. Id. at 139. See generally MALONE, supra
note 23, § 4.03[2] (discussing the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA).
28. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988).
29. 33 U.S.C § 1344(a) (1988). The statute states:
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the
date an applicant submits all the information required to complete an application for a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the
notice required by this subsection.
Id.

30. For the regulatory definition of a wetland see supra note 4 and accompanying text. The definition of a wetland is currently the source of great debate. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. E923 (daily ed. March 13, 1991) (statement of

Rep. Tauzin), and the subject of pending bills on Capitol Hill. See, e.g., H.R.
1330, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991). See generally FEDERAL MANUAL FOR
IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS (1989) (stating the
technical criteria for delineating a wetland for regulatory purposes).
31. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)-(d) (1991). The statute lists the following criteria which must be met before the Corps will issue a permit "(1) there is no
practicable alternative; (2) there will be no significant adverse impacts on
aquatic resources; (3) all reasonable mitigation is employed; and (4) there will
be no statutory violations by the proposed activity." MALONE, supra note 23,
§ 4.03[3][e]. See generally O'Hagan, supra note 5, at 1069-70 (discussing the
Corps' criteria used in the section 404 permit process).
32. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988). The regulation states:
The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specification (including the
withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is
authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for specification
(including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site, whenever he
determines, after notice and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse
effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (includ-
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denied, the landowner may claim that the denial of the permit 34
effects a taking of property, so as to require just compensation
under the Constitution. Claims filed against the federal government 35 must be filed in the United States Claims Court under the
Tucker Act.38
B.
1.

The Takings Clause and the Supreme Court

The Takings Clause

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."3 7 This language requires that the government pay
ing spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas. Before
making such determination, the Administrator shall consult with the Secretary. The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make public his
findings and his reasons for making any determination under this
subsection.
Id. See also Ted Griswold, Wetland Protection Under Section 404 of the Clean
WaterAct: An EnforcementParadox,27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 139, 149 n.63 (1990)
(discussing EPA's unlimited use of its veto authority under § 404(c)).
During the summer of 1992, while this Note was being published an inter-

esting challenge to the EPA's veto authority took place. A United States District Judge issued an injunction against William Reilly, the head of the EPA, for
overruling the veto of a permit approval by his own regional office.

The Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) approved a permit for the development of a golf course on wetlands in the Sleepy Bear Dunes
National Lakeshore. Michigan is the only state in the nation with power to
grant a § 404 permit. Approval of the permit was vetoed by the EPA regional
office in Chicago. The director of the EPA withdrew the veto. The district
Court Judge enjoined the director's action. At the date of publication, an appeal
was under consideration. See Judge Rules Against Homestead Golf Course,
MICIUGAN OUT-OF-DOORS, August 1992, at 9; Eric Sharp, Don'tLeave Environment in Hands of Politicians,DET. FRE PRESS, June 12,1992, at 1OD; Dawson
Bell, Judge Blocks Golf Course, DuT. FREE PREss, June 9, 1992 at IA; Casey
Bukro, EPA Staff Overruled in Wetlands-Resort Case, CmI. TRIB., May 9,1992,
at 1.
33. See 40 C.F.R. § 231.2(a) (1991). "'Withdrawal specification' means to remove from designation any area already specified as a disposal site by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers or by a state which has assumed the section 404 program, or any portion of such area." Id.
34. A takings claim is not ripe until the regulatory agency makes its final
decision regarding the regulation of the property in question. See Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,127 (1985)
(the denial of a permit is a prerequisite for a takings claim).
35. Takings claims may be filed against state and local agencies as well as
the federal government. See, e.g., Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1975);
Marinette County v. Just, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). The Tucker Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to
the Claims Court over suits against the federal government for money damages
in excess of $10,000. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
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the landowner a fair price for private property taken by the government for public use. Takings can occur in two ways: eminent
domain or inverse condemnation. Eminent domain is the legal proceeding whereby government uses its authority to condemn private
property for public use.S9 The majority of claims based on the Fifth
Amendment have been cases involving eminent domain.39
However, with the increased regulation of land, inverse condemnation or "regulatory takings" claims have also increased. 40
With inverse condemnation, the landowner also seeks the value of
the property from the government, however there is no physical
taking involved. Instead, the "taking" results from a regulation 4 '
on the use of the land. A regulatory taking occurs when government regulation so restricts the use of a landowner's property that
in effect, the property has been taken from the landowner so as to
require just compensation. 42 Thus, regulatory takings are much
harder to resolve.43 The determination is whether the public,
rather than a private landowner, should bear the cost of an exercise
of state power.44 While only one Supreme Court case has ruled on a
takings claim under section 404 of the CWA, 45 the Court's rulings in
other regulatory takings cases provide guidance in takings challenges under section 404.
2. The Balancing Test
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
47
Mahon 46 was the launching pad for regulatory takings claims. It
was the first case to articulate the factors for the balancing of interWar or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law;, nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation.
Id.
38. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990) (defining eminent domain as the "power to
take private property for public use by the state, municipalities and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character").

39. Meltz, supra note 2, at 95.
40. Id.
41. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 424 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See William W. Want, The Taking Defense To Wetlands Regulation, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. 10169 (1984).

43. Id.
44.
45.
46.
surface

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1979).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Mahon, the Pennsylvania Coal Company sold
rights to the Mahons for property in which the coal company retained

mineral rights to mine coal. Id. at 412. The Mahons lived on the property and
sought an injunction against Pennsylvania Coal from mining the property based

on the provisions of the Kohler Act. Id. The Act required the excavator of coal
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ests used to determine when regulation ends and takings begin.48
In Mahon, Justice Holmes acknowledged that government could
not exist if it had to pay for every change in the law, but also recognized that there were limits to the amount of regulation that can be
imposed without cost to the government. 49 Holmes did not want to
set up a "general proposition."50 Instead, he analyzed the particular
facts of the case, weighing public and private interests to decide
who should bear the costs of the regulation. 51 In doing so, the
Court ruled that the regulation in Mahon extended too far, and de52
stroyed existing property rights.
Not until 1978, with its decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,-" did the Court attempt to further deto leave supports under any homes in order to prevent subsistence of the land.
Id. at 412-413.
Pennsylvania Coal argued that the regulation did not protect the general
public but rather a "particular class," and because the company's use of the land
was restricted it constituted "as much of a taking as if the land itself had been
appropriated." Id. at 395. The State of Pennsylvania argued that the Kohler
Act was the only way to protect the health and welfare of the public from unsafe mining. Id. The State further argued that the Act did not "take" the property because under the act Pennsylvania Coal was not prohibited from mining
coal, but only had to provide (or could not take away) supports. Id. at 411.
47. See Charles H. Clarke, ConstitutionalProperty Rights and the Taking
of the Police Power: The Aftermath of Nollan and First English, 20 Sw. U. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1991).
48. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Id.
49. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. Justice Holmes made the following statement
in regard to balancing the interests:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits.
Id.
50. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. However, Holmes singled out the extent of the
diminution in the value of the land as a result of the regulation as one factor
which was important in the takings analysis. Id. at 413.
51. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-414. In weighing the facts, Holmes determined
that the diminution was too great and therefore, compensation was required to
offset the taking. Id. at 414-415.
52. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
53. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central has been described by the Court itself
as containing "one of the most complete discussions of the Takings Clause."
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982).
In Penn Central, the plaintiff Penn Central owned Grand Central Station
in New York City and brought suit over the denial of its plans to build a fiftystory tower on top of the station. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 115-18. Penn Central claimed the Landmark Preservation Law restricted the use of their property by denying, and in effect, taking the use of their air rights without
compensation. Id. at 130. The Supreme Court affirmed the New York lower
court ruling that the regulation had not been so restrictive as to create a taking.
Id. at 122.
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velop the factors enunciated in Mahon. In Penn Central,the Court
again focused on the balancing of public and private interests under
the Takings Clause. However, the Court developed further factors
significant to the takings analysis.-4
The Court acknowledged that it was unable to come up with
any set formula for determining when a taking has occurred. 55 The
Court did, however, propose three factors which should "have particular significance"-' 6 in the outcome of takings cases. The factors
were: 1) the character of the government action, 2) the economic
impact of the regulation, and 3) the extent of the interference with
investment-backed expectations. 57 The Court suggested that the
lower courts apply the facts to each of these factors to determine
when a regulation had gone so far that the public should bear the
58
cost instead of the individual.
One year later, the Court in Agins v. Tiburon5 9 proposed a variation to the factors announced in Penn Central. The analysis continued to weigh public versus private interests, 60 but in doing so, the
Court set forth a two-pronged approach, of which either prong
could be used to determine when a government action constituted a
taking.6 1 The Court stated that a taking occurs if the government
regulation does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests" or if the regulation "denies an owner economically viable use
62
of his land."
Since Agins, courts balance the public and private interests in
order to determine who should bear the costs of the regulation by
applying the Agins two-pronged test.63 If it is proven that the regulation substantially advances "legitimate state interests, '"6 then the
court will consider whether the regulation left the landowner with
54. Id. at 124.

55. Id. The Court stated that lower courts should conduct an ad hoc factual
analysis of each case. Id.

56. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124.
57. Id. at 124.
58. Id. at 123 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
59. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, the Court denied plaintiff's claim that a
local land use ordinance had taken plaintiff's property because it destroyed the
value of the land by limiting development. Id. at 259.
60. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
61. See Meltz, supra note 2, at 95-96.
62. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
63. Id. at 260-261.
64. The first prong of the Agins analysis is usually not given much scrutiny
in takings claims challenging section 404 and the courts have accepted that the
Clean Water Act and section 404 substantially advance the legitimate state interest of preserving our nation's wetlands. See Florida Rock Industries v.
United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1053
(1987), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appealdocketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 30, 1991). See also Meltz, supra note 2, at 96 (suggesting that the Supreme
Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987),
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any economically viable use in the land. In applying the second
prong of Agins, courts analyze the Penn Central factors by considering the character of the government action, 65 the economic impact,66 and interference with investment-backed expectations. 67 If
it is determined that no economically viable use remains, then a
taking has occurred and the court will grant just compensation68
3.

The "NuisanceException"

Some regulations promote the public good to such an extent
that the courts find them immune to takings challenges.6 9 This
idea was most prominently stated as early as 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas.70 In Mugler, the Court ruled that a regulation that prohibited
the sale of liquor, effectively shutting down the plaintiff's brewery,
was not a taking because it avoided a nuisance. 71 The "nuisance
exception" applies when a regulation seriously impairs the rights of
a landowner, but is exempt from a takings challenge because it
will encourage closer scrutiny into whether a regulation substantially advances
a legitimate state interest).
65. The Court has provided some insight into the character of the government action in question. See Meltz, supra note 2, at 95. The Court stated that
an action would be more readily ruled a taking if a physical invasion occurred as
opposed to a regulation aimed at promoting the public good. See Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). This idea was taken a
step further in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Co., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), where the Court stated that government actions which caused a physical
occupation of the land constituted a taking "per se." Id. at 434-35. Under this
formula, no matter how small the occupation, it would constitute a taking requiring just compensation and consideration of the other factors would be unnecessary. Id. at 435. A per se formula would not apply to a regulation, such as
section 404, because the government regulation does not constitute a physical
occupation of the land.
66. The economic impact is determined by analyzing the "parcel as a
whole," Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131
(1978), in order to compare the fair market value before and after the regulation to determine the diminution in value caused by the regulation. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
67. "A 'reasonable investment-backed expectation' must be more than a
'unilateral expectation or an abstract need."' Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467
U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). See also Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 317
(1991) (ruling that landowner did not have a reasonable investment-backed expectations because of knowledge that land was undevelopable).
68. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
69. See Meltz, supra note 2, at 96.
70. 123 U.S 623 (1887).
71. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. The Court stated:

All property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.... A prohibition
simply on the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation for the public
benefit.
Id. at 668-69.
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72
abates a use that is harmful to the public's health and welfare.
A century later,73 the Court embraced the nuisance exception
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.7 4 The Court
stated that it was hesitant "to find a taking when the State merely
restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances." 75 Through its thorough discussion of the nuisance exception, the Court reestablished the argument that when the
government regulates to ensure the '"health, morals and safety of
the community"76 it should be exempt from paying just compensation. Howeyer, it is unclear whether the nuisance exception will be
extended to environmental regulations such as section 404 of the
77
Clean Water Act.

72. See Meltz, supra note 2, at 96 (discussing the Court's "flirtation" with an
absolute immunity from takings claims); see also Jan G. Laitos, Section 404 and
WiaterRights Takings, 60 U. COLO. REV. 901, 921 (1989) (discussing the application of the nuisance exception to section 404 because it prevents harm to water
quality).
73. In 1987, the Supreme Court handed down three decisions that have become known as "The Trilogy." See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987). Although these cases have been extensively written about,
it is still unclear what their effect will be on takings claims brought under section 404.
The decisions in Loveladies and Florida Rock relied only upon Keystone
regarding the analysis of the nuisance exception. The claims courts did not rely
on Nollan or FirstEnglish, at least in any overt way, in coming to their decisions. For that reason and because of the vast amount of material written about
Nollan and FirstEnglish, they will not be discussed in this Note. For a sampling of the discussions regarding "The Trilogy," see generally, William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism In Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1581 (1988); Charles H. Clarke, ConstitutionalPropertyRights
and the Taking of the PolicePower: The Aftermath of Nollan and First English,
20 Sw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990); Frank Michelman, Takings 1987,88 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1988); Robert Duncan, On the Status of Robbing Peter to Pay Pau" The
1987 Takings Cases in the Supreme Court, 67 NEB. L. REV. 318 (1988).
74. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In Keystone, the Supreme Court ruled that the regulation of coal mining did not constitute a taking. Id. at 506. The Court did not,
however, rely upon the nuisance exception for its decision because the plaintiff
also failed to show a sufficient diminution in value. Id. at 492-93.
75. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491. The Court further stated
Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their
property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we,
in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.
Id.
76. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
77. See infra notes 102-08 and 158-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nuisance exception in FloridaRock and Loveladies.
On June 29, 1992, while this Note was being published, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court of South Carolina's use of the "nuisance exception" to avoid a regulatory taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, No. 91-453, 1992 WL 142517 (U.S.S.C. June 29, 1992). In Lucas,
the Court appears to have effectively cut off the use of the "nuisance exception"
to justify regulation and protection of natural resources.
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II. ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA RocK AND LOVELA.DIES
A.
1.

Factualand ProceduralHistory of Loveladies and
Florida Rock

Florida Rock Industries v. United States7 s

Florida Rock Industries ("Florida Rock") was in the business of
mining and converting limestone into aggregate for use in concrete
products.7 9 In 1972, Florida Rock purchased 1,560 acres of land in
West Dade County, Florida for $2,964,000.80 The land was part of
the Everglades ecosystem and acted as a natural filter for the Biscayne aquifer, Miami's main source of drinking water.8 1 At the
time of the purchase, the land was zoned for mining.8 2 Due to a
slowdown in Florida's construction industry, Florida Rock did not
mine the land until 1978.83 In 1978, Florida Rock started mining
limestone from the land84 and continued until the Corps ordered
them to cease and desist for lack of a section 404 permit.8 5 Subsequent to the date of purchase, the Clean Water Act had been
amended to include section 404, requiring a permit for the discharge
of dredged or fill materials into waters under the jurisdiction of the

CWA. s8
78. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 C1. Ct. 160 (1985), qff'd in part
and vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1053
(1987), on remand,21 C. Ct. 161 (1990), appealdocketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 30, 1991).
79. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 895. Limestone is extracted and converted
into aggregate, which is the basic material used for concrete products in the
construction industry. Id.
80. Id. The land is located just west of Miami, Florida in the path of development moving toward the west. Id. Because of the general increase in development in the southern part of Florida during the 1970s and 1980s, the rich
limestone deposits in that area became difficult to acquire. Id.
81. Id. See also Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum of Law and Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (No. 266-82L), appealdocketed, No. 91-5156
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991) [hereinafter Defendant's Proposed Findings and Conclusions] (describing the land as consisting mainly of sawgrass marsh).
82. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 895. The tract of land was locally zoned for
mining without consent from the federal government. Id.
83. Id.
84. The CWA was amended to include section 404 in 1972. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1988). For further discussion of section 404 and the CWA, see supra
notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
85. See FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 895-96. Florida Rock employed a method
of mining limestone, known as "drag lining," which included the discharge of
dredged materials. Id. at 895. The process entailed the use of a "drag line"
which sat on solid ground and removed muck and vegetation, exposing the
limestone underneath for extraction. Id. The muck and vegetation was then
either discharged as fill to form a base for the dragline or discharged into the
open area now devoid of limestone. Id. The process is repeated until the limestone is gone, leaving the land with filled areas and a newly formed lake. Id.
86. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990) appeal docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991). While the Corps was not
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On October 1, 1978, Florida Rock applied for a section 404 permit for 98 of the 1,560 acres of wetlands.8 7 After reviewing the relevant criter.a,8 s the Corps denied the application, stating that it was
not in the public interest to grant the permit.8 9 Florida Rock opted
not to appeal the Corps' decision, but rather, filed a takings claim in
the United States Claims Court seeking just compensation. 9° As is
the practice in the Claims Court, the suit was divided into separate
trials for liability and damages. 91
At the trial regarding liability, Florida Rock argued that it
purchased the property with the sole intention of mining limessure Florida Rock's land was within the jurisdiction of the section 404 permit
program, it issued a cease and desist order based upon a belief that it was within
the jurisdiction. Id. See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985) (regarding a parcel of low-lying land, which the Corps
believed was within its jurisdiction under the CWA).
87. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 895. For reasons the decision does not state,
the Corps refused to consider an application for the entire 1,560 acres even
though Florida Rock eventually intended to mine the entire parcel. Id. Thus,
Florida Rock applied for a permit for enough land to yield three years of production which they estimated to be 98 acres. Id. See also Defendant's Proposed
Findings and Conclusions, supra note 81, at 5 (of the 98 acres, Florida Rock
proposed to fill 45 acres and excavate 53 acres).
88. See supra note 31 and accompanying text regarding the Corps criteria.
See also FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 895 (stating that the EPA, National Park
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, State of Florida and Dade County all objected to the permit denial based on the loss of wetlands and pollution caused by
the mining).
89. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168. See also Brief for the Appellant at 8,
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1053 (1637), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appealdocketed,
No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991) (Nos. 85-2588, 85-2609) [hereinafter Brief
for the Appellant]. The Corps' ultimate findings on the application are listed as
follows:
The proposed discharge is a significant environmental impact on important
wetlands with associated valuable fish and wildlife resources of the United
States. Our review indicated it will cause a permanent unacceptable disruption to the beneficial water quality uses of the aquatic ecosystem. It is
not dependent on being located in a wetland area. The site is not the least
environmentally damaging site available, and we find the private benefits
of the proposed activities do not outweigh the negative impacts on wetlands
of the United States necessary to realize those benefits. In view of the
above analysis, we have determined that not issuing this permit is in compliance with the 404(b) guidelines and with the Corps' wetland poliies ....
We have reviewed all the information available in the administrative permit files, have analyzed the impact of the project, and carefully considered
the implication of the denial of this permit. This review, together with our
knowledge of the area, indicates that it is not in the public interest to issue
this permit at this time.
Id.
90. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 164 (1985), aff'd
in partand vacated in part,791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 497 U.S.
1053 (1987), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
91. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 896.
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tone,92 and, therefore, the value of the land as used for limestone
mining should be the measure of the land's "highest and best
use."93 Because the Corps' denial of the permit prevented the highest and best use of the land, Florida Rock argued that it was left
without any economically viable use of the land.94 Therefore, because the regulation made the land valueless, Florida Rock concluded that just compensation was due for the entire 1,560 acres. 95
The government disagreed, arguing that denial of one possible use
of the land did not render the land valueless.9 6 The government
further argued that a market existed for the land in question 97 and
that the highest and best use was not mining, but the purchasing of
98
the property for investment purposes.
The Claims Court ruled that the denial of the section 404 permit constituted a taking and therefore, just compensation was due
Florida Rock for the 98-acre tract for which the Corps denied a permit.9 The court stated that the government's theory of fair market
92. Id. See also Brief for the Appellant, supra note 89, at 9 (stating that the

president of Florida Rock stated at trial that the only reason Florida Rock

bought the property in question was to mine limestone from it).
93. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 171. According to the American Institute of
Real Estate Appraisers, the "highest and best use" is defined as "[t]he reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is
physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value." Id. (citingTHE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 19 (9th
ed. 1987)).
94. FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164. Florida Rock's value theory focused on
the loss due to the inability to use the property for mining rather than on a fair
market analysis. Id. See also FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 896 (vacating the Court
of Claims' decision because it relied on immediate use rather than fair market
value and wrongly embraced the theory that the permit denial left no value in
the land because it could not be used for mining).
95. See FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164. Florida Rock originally sought compensation for the entire 1,560 acres based on a theory that the permit denial of
the 98 acres represented a taking of the entire parcel. See Florida Rock Indus.
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 n.2 (1990). They argued that the entire parcel was similar in its composition as wetlands and therefore, if the 98 acre tract
was denied a permit, the rest of the property would also be denied a permit. Id.
The Claims Court disagreed with Florida Rock and ruled that 98 acres was the
proper unit to be considered. Id.
96. FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 165. The government argued that Florida
Rock still retained valuable rights as owners of the property such as the right to
sell, to lease, to restrict or permit others on the property and the right to use
the land in its condition as a wetland. Id.
97. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 896. The government presented evidence of an
offer to buy the property for $4,000 per acre which Florida Rock rejected. Id.
Further, real estate experts presented evidence of a fair market value of
$5,466,000 for the entire 1,560 acre parcel. Id. See Brief for the Appellant, supra
note 89, at 9-16.
98. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 170. The government argued that a fair market existed of people who would buy the property and hold onto it in hopes of
the regulations changing or the value of the land appreciating. FloridaRock, 8
Cl. Ct. at 167.
99. FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 179.
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value was too speculative.' 09 Instead, the court accepted Florida
Rock's argument that the denial of the permit eliminated the only
available use of the 98-acre tract of land.1 0 '
Alternatively, the government argued that the "nuisance exception" 10 2 should apply to this case because Florida Rock's mining
activities would pollute the area and be harmful to the public
health and welfare. 0 3 Thus, the government reasoned that the
abatement of the mining through regulation was in the public interest, and therefore, exempt from a takings claim. 1° 4 The Claims
Court also dismissed this argument, ruling that mining would not
have adverse effects on the environment 1 0 5 The Claims Court
stated that the theory of a "nuisance exception" was losing favor in
the courts and that the holding in Mugler v. Kansas should be applied narrowly. 10 6 The Claims Court stated, "[g]overnment may not
circumvent the takings clause by defining an activity as pollution."' 0 7 Therefore, the Claims Court rejected the nuisance theory
and ruled that a taking had occurred on October 2, 1980, the day of
the permit denial.'0 8 The court also ruled that Florida Rock was
entitled to just compensation, 0 9 which it determined to be
$1,029,000 at the damage trial. L0
The government appealed the Claims Court's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."' The cir100. Id. at 167. The Claims Court stated, "[t]he existence of a market for
plaintiff's property, despite what the court has found to be its uselessness for all
productive activity, is based upon speculators' expectations that they will be
able to pass the property on to hapless investors .. ." Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nuisance exception.
103. Florri Rock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 171.
104. Id. at 169-76. The government argued that Florida Rock could not argue
that its mining would not cause pollution because the mining required a section
404 permit under the CWA, which administers the discharge of pollutants in our
nation's waters. See id. at 171-72. The government then argued that the pollution would reach a level which would contaminate the water supply. Id. at 172.
Finally, the government argued that the destruction of wetlands would lead to
the loss of "'valuable habitat and food chain resources."' Id. at 175. See supra
notes 69-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nuisance exception.
105. FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 171. The court stated that the government
failed to show that Florida Rock's proposed activities had "serious adverse physical effects upon the health, welfare or property of others." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 179.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 897. On May 6, 1985, at the trial regarding damages, the Claims
Court awarded Florida Rock $1,029,000 for the 98 acre tract ($10,500 per acre).
Id.
111. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 894. In addition, Florida Rock cross appealed,
arguing that the entire 1,560 had been taken, but the circuit court denied the
cross appeal. Id. at 895.
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cult court vacated much of the trial court's findings and remanded
the case to the Claims Court for further deliberation. 112 In its opinion, the Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of whether Florida
Rock's use of the land was a use which could be abated under the
i 3 While the Circuit
nuisance exception theory to avoid a taking."
Court acknowledged the possibility of a "nuisance exception,""i 4 it
ruled that in this case the amount of pollution resulting from the
mining was insufficient to raise it to a level of nuisance."15

The Federal Circuit next determined that the Claims Court incorrectly applied an "immediate use analysis" instead of determining the fair market value of the property."16 The Federal Circuit
further stated that the denial of the best and highest use of land is
not determinative of a taking."17 The Federal Circuit instructed the
Claims Court on remand to consider Florida Rock's investment in
the property, together with a comparison of the fair market values
of the land before and after the permit denial, to determine the se8
verity of the economic impact caused by the regulation."
112. Id. at 905-06.
113. Id. at 900.
114. Id. The circuit court stated: 'While the court below deemed Mugler's
precedential value much abated, we may concede as a hypothetical, if Florida
Rock produced on its tract a fluid as septic as Kansas then considered beer to
be, and proposed to drain it into the Miami drinking water, this could be
stopped without compensation." Id.
115. Id. at 904. The circuit court stated that "[t]he pollution of the water,
though the necessary hook for jurisdiction of the Army engineers, is not
claimed in the district engineer's decision to be by itself very serious." Id.
The circuit court also weighed the public interest in abatement of the potential harm caused by Florida Rock's mining against the expense of maintaining a public benefit in preserving the wetlands and decided that Florida Rock's
interest was much more deserving. Id. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 389 (1988) (discussing the harm/benefit distinction
being difficult to differentiate between the situation where the government is
acting to preserve benefits from when it acts to prevent harm).
116. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 902. The "immediate use" analysis was based
on Florida Rock's inability to mine the property after the permit denial, regardless of whether a fair market value existed. Id. at 901. See also Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (stating that evidence of a diminution
in fair market value is necessary for a taking to be found).
117. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 901. See also Deltona Corp. v. United States,
657 F.2d 1184, 1194 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (rejecting plaintiff's
argument that denial of highest and best use constituted a taking); Jentgen v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (1981), (denial of highest and best use, by
itself, does not constitute a taking) cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
118. FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 905. The Federal Circuit made the following
comment regarding the market value:
Indeed, if there is found to exist a solid and adequate fair market value (for
the 98 acres) which Florida Rock could have obtained from others for that
property, that would be a sufficient remaining use of the property to forestall a determination that a taking had occurred or that any just compensation had to be paid by the government.
Id. at 903.
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On remand, the Claims Court allowed the parties to submit evidence to determine issues surrounding the government's "nuisance
exception" argument and whether any economically viable use of
the 98 acres existed after the permit denial."i 9 With the support of
the recently decided Supreme Court case, Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,120 the government revived its "nuisance

exception" defense. The government argued that Florida Rock's
mining activities would not only threaten the water quality of the
Biscayne aquifer, but would also destroy valuable wetlands through
the discharge of fill material. 12 ' Therefore, the government argued
that the regulation of such a harmful activity was in the public interest and immune from an award of just compensation. 2 2 On remand the Claims Court again disagreed with the government and
ruled that Florida Rock's mining would produce only moderate pollution, not reaching the level of a nuisance which would exempt the
government from a takings claim.'m
The Claims Court next considered arguments from the government and Florida Rock regarding the denial of all economically viable use of the 98 acres. 124 In doing so, the court focused on the
traditional factors enunciated in Penn Central TransportationCo.
v. New York City :2 the character of the government action, i 2S the
interference with investment-backed expectations i 27 and the de119. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 165 (1990) appeal
docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
120. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Keystone.
121. FloridaRock, 21 Cl.Ct. at 166.
122. Id. The government argued that Congress enacted the CWA to monitor
activities which were potentially against public interests. Id. Therefore, because Florida Rock's proposed mining was an activity which Congress has chosen to have monitored, the Corps' decision should be exempt from a takings
claim because it is in the public interest. Id.
123. Id. at 167. The claims court stated. "[r]ock mining of the type at issue
here is not considered a nuisance in this area." Id.
124. FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct at 165-69.
125. Id. at 166-171.
126. See FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168-169. Although neither side raised the
issue, the claims court discussed the character of the government action. Id. at
168. The court stated that the balance of public and private interest was tilted
in favor of Florida Rock because it could have begun mining when it bought the
property in 1972 instead of waiting until 1978 and been grandfathered in under
the section 404 permit program (established in 1972 after Florida Rock
purchased the property). Id.
127. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 176. The court recognized that diminution in
value alone is not a basis for a taking. Id. at 175-76 (citing Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 131). Therefore, the court discussed the interference with investmentbacked expectations and ruled that Florida Rock had invested in the property
for the sole purpose of mining and because of the permit denial was unable to
pursue the profits associated with it. Id. at 176.
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gree of the economic impact.' m
The court focused on the comparison of the fair market value
of the 98 acres before the section 404 permit denial with the fair
market value after the denial.' 9 The Claims Court ruled that the
purchase price of the land was determinative of the fair market
value before the permit was denied. 130 Therefore, the court determined the fair market of the land value before the permit denial
was $10,500 per acre, the adjusted price Florida Rock originally paid
for the land.131
The court then considered the fair market value after the denial of the section 404 permit.'3 2 The government argued that a fair
market existed, made up of real and knowledgeable investors, who
were aware of the restrictions on the property.' 3 3 The government
argued that the property was worth $4,000 per acre,'4 citing three
offers to purchase the property which were rejected by Florida
Rock.13 5 Florida Rock, on the other hand, argued that the highest
and best use of the property after the permit denial was "future
L3 6
recreational/water management" use, valued at $500 an acre.

The Claims Court agreed with Florida Rock and ruled that the
128. The Claims Court focused the most attention on the degree of economic

impact as manifested by the diminution in value of the land after the permit
denial. Id. at 169-75.

129. Id. at 169.
130. Id. at 169. The Claims Court made the following comments:
The Court agrees with defendant that acquisition cost is rarely a basis for
establishing the value of land prior to an alleged regulatory taking....
Further, the court is convinced that although this method may not be the
ideal one chosen by appraisal experts, it does provide an adequate basis for
determining the fair market value prior to the government action.
Id.
131. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 169. In 1972, Florida Rock paid $1,250 per
acre for the property. Id. at 176. After adjusting for the "changing value of
money and realty over time," Florida Rock convinced the court that the acquisition cost was now equivalent to $10,500 per acre. Id. at 169 n.5.
132. Id. at 170.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 172. The government based its estimate on using the land for investment purposes as the highest and best use of the land. Id. See also Defendant's Proposed Findings and Conclusions, supra note 81, at 11 (citing evidence
from Florida Rock's expert regarding the sales of 200 parcels of land around or
near the property during 1970-1988 for $4,000 to $8,000 per acre).
135. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 170 n.7. The government offered evidence of
a real estate broker from Arizona offering 3.5 million dollars for the 1,560 acres
and another offer of 5 million dollars. Id. See also Brief for the Appellant,
supra note 89, at 9 (citing Florida Rock's president testifying that he turned
down an offer to purchase the land for $4,000 per acre).
136. FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 172. Florida Rock's expert conducted a statistical analysis of property in the area and surveyed the owners in order to determine their knowledge of restrictions on the land and their motivation for
buying the property. Id.
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fair market value after the permit denial was $500 per acre.1 3 7 This
value, when compared to the fair market value before the denial,
represented a 95% a diminution in the value of the land.138 Therefore, the Claims Court determined that the government had denied
Florida Rock all economically viable use of the land by denying the
section 404 permit and had, in effect, taken the land.139 Thus, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, the Claims Court awarded Florida Rock "just compensation" in the amount of $1,029,000, $10,500
140
per acre.
141
2. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States

In 1955, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. ("Loveladies") purchased 250
acres of vacant land on Long Beach Island in Ocean County, New
Jersey for $300,000.L42 Much of the property was low-lying marsh
which needed to be filled before it could be developed. 143 By 1972,
Loveladies had filled and developed 199 acres of the parcel and constructed 375 houses on the property. 144
In the early 1970s, 51 acres remained to be developed. 145 How14 7
jurisdicever, by that date the land fell under state1 46 and federal
137. Id. at 175.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 176.
140. Id. The proper measure of just compensation in a Fifth Amendment
claim is the fair market value before the taking. Yuba Natural Resources v.
United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Claims Court determined the taking to have occurred on the date the permit was denied. Florida
Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 176. Therefore, interest was awarded for the period beginning the October 2, 1980 and ending on the date of the judgment, July 23, 1990.
Id.
141. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 C1. Ct. 381, (1988), summary
udgnent denied, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 15, 1991).
142. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum at 4, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (No. 243-83L), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 15,1991) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum].
143. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 142, at 4.
144. Defendant's Post-Trail Memorandum at 5, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (No. 243-83L), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum].
145. Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 144, at 5.
146. See Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum, supranote 142, at 3. The State
of New Jersey required owners of wetlands to obtain a permit from the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection in order to fill wetlands. Id.
See also New Jersey Wetlands Act of 1970, N.J. STAT. ANN., § 13:9A-1 (West
1990).

147. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). Because the land was classified as wetlands,
Loveladies was required to obtain a section 404 permit in accordance with the
Clean Water Act from the Corps of Engineers. See id.
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tion as wetlands which required permits in order to be filled. 148
Following a struggle through the state permit process, Loveladies
obtained a fill permit for 11.5 acres of the 51-acre tract. 149 At the
same time, Loveladies applied for federal permits under section 404
of the Clean Water Act.'i s In both 1975 and 1977, the Corps denied
Loveladies' application for a permit for the entire 55 acres. 15 1 Love152
ladies then applied for a third time, in 1981, for only 11.5 acres.
Despite some attempts to mitigate by Loveladies, the Corps denied
the application on May 5, 1982.1's The Corps' District Engineer
stated a concern that the discharge of fill material into the property
would have an adverse effect on flood control, water quality, and
coastal wildlife and fisheries.Lm
Loveladies filed a takings claim a' s in the United States Claims
Court seeking just compensation for 12.5 acres on April 14, 1983.1-s
Prior to the Claims Court trial, both the government and Loveladies filed motions for summary judgment. 157 In its motion, the government first argued that the denial of the section 404 permit
promoted the goals of the Clean Water Act'-s by preventing degra148. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383 (1988), summaryjudgment denied,21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), appealdocketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
149. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384. In 1977, Loveladies applied for a state permit under the New Jersey Wetlands Act of 1970 and was denied. Id. Upon
reapplication, the permit was denied again by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection ("NJDEP"). Id. Instead of modifying the application, Loveladies refused an offer by the NJDEP to modify the application to
12.5 acres, and appealed the decision, claiming a taking under the fifth amendment. Id. Loveladies lost the appeal and reapplied for a permit covering only
the 12.5 acres of which one acre was already filled. Id. Honoring its earlier
settlement offer, the NJDEP granted a permit for the remaining 11.5 acres. Id.
See also In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 422 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. 1980), cert.
denied, 427 A.2d 588 (N.J. Super. 1981).
150. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
151. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 142, at 3.
152. Loveladies, 15 Cl.Ct. at 384.
153. Id.
154. See Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 144, at 8.
155. Prior to filing a takings claim, Loveladies unsuccessfully challenged the
validity of the permit denial in a federal district court. Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. Baldwin, 20 ERC 1897 (D.N.J. 1984) aff'd without opinion, 15 ENVTL. L. REP.
20,088 (1984). Loveladies appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, where the Corps' decision was upheld. Id.
156. Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 144, at 10. Loveladies
sought compensation for all 12.5 acres, arguing that even though one acre didn't
require a permit, it would be adversely affected as part of the development plan
if the permit for the other 11.5 acres was denied. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 384.
157. See generally Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 383
(1988), summary judgment denied, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No.
91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
158. Id. at 388; see also supranote 21 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the goals of the CWA.

The John Marshall Law Review[

[Vol. 25:837

dation of the water quality and the destruction of wetlands. 15 9
Therefore, the government argued its action should be exempt
from a takings claim.1 6° The court disagreed, citing the 1986 Claims
Court decision in ForidaRock for the proposition that the anticipated pollution would not reach the level of a nuisance. 161 The
court reasoned that because the pollution resulting from the filling
of the wetlands in this case was even less than that in ForkaRock,
it could not be considered a nuisance. 162 Thus, the court dismissed
63
the government's "nuisance exception" argument prior to trial.'
The government's second argument was that the original 250acre parcel should be considered as a whole to determine the economic impact of the permit denial. 164 The court again disagreed
with the government's theory and ruled that the property unit to be
considered was the 12.5 acres.165 The court then analyzed the 12.5acre parcel in light of the traditional Penn Central16 factors in order to determine if any economically viable use remained after the
permit denial.' 6 7 The court determined the economic impact of the
denial by comparing the fair market value before the permit denial
($3,790,000)168 to the stipulated fair market value after the permit
denial ($13,725),169 which represented a diminution in value of
98%.170 The diminution in value together with the character of the
159. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.

160. Id.
161. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 175 (1985), aff 'd
in ipart and vacated in part,791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 497 U.S.

1053 (1987), on remand,21 C1. Ct. 161 (1990), appealdocketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
162. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388.
163. Id. at 389.

164. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392. The government's rationale was that the
large profits made from developing the approximately 200 acres would create a
minor diminution in value compared to the diminution if the 12.5 acres were
considered separately. Id.
165. Id. The government also argued that the one acre of upland should not
be considered for compensation because it did not fall under the Corps jurisdiction. Id. at 396. The court disagreed and ruled that the one acre should be included because it was cut-off by wetlands. Id.
166. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Penn
Central.
167. See Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 396.
168. Id. at 394. The fair market value before the permit denial for the 12.5
acres was valued at $3,790,000 based on residential development use. Id.
169. Id. at 394. The Ard Appraisal Company valued the 12.5 acres at
$13,725.50 based on its possible use for a private or public sector conservation

area. Id.
170. Id. at 394. See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (90%
diminution in value was insufficient to establish a taking); Village of Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,384 (1926) (95% diminution in value was insufficient to establish a taking); Q. C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331 (D.R.I.
1986) (90% diminution in value was sufficient to establish a taking), aff'd with-
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government action i7 1 and the interference with investment-backed
income, 172 led the court to deny the government's motion for summary judgment.' 73 The court stated that it was "hard to imagine a
takings claim more deserving of compensation."' 74
Loveladies filed its own motion for summary judgment based
on the argument that the undisputed values of the land before and
after the permit denial left Loveladies without any economically viable use of the land, and therefore as a matter of law a taking occurred.' 75 But the government, in defending against the motion,
offered a new theory of a viable use for the property. The government argued that the fair market value after the denial of the permit was $68,000 instead of $13,725 because of the existence of one
acre of undeveloped upland.'7 6 Because the government's theory
represented a factual dispute, the Claims Court sent the case to
trial. 17 7 Only one issue remained for trial, whether Loveladies

could prove that the government's refusal to grant the section 404
permit denied all economically viable use of the land. 7 8
Its two main arguments having been defeated at the summary
judgment stage, the government argued at trial that Loveladies
failed to explore all of the economically viable uses of the 12.5
acres.1 79 The government proposed that the land could be used as a
hunting area, a mitigation site, a marina, a salt hay farm, or a vacant
out opinion, 836 F.2d 1340 (1st Cir. 1987); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States,
21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (95% diminution in value was sufficient to establish a taking), appeal docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
171. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391. The court did not place much emphasis on
the character of the government action because the denial of the section 404
permit did not reach the level of physical intrusion common in eminent domain
cases. Id.
172. Id. at 391. The court stated that Loveladies' investment-backed expectations were frustrated because they purchased the land for development or resale and the denial of this permit drastically affected those expectations. Id.
173. Id. at 396.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 397. Loveladies argued the only use that remained after the denial of the section 404 permit was as a wildlife preserve. Id.
176. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 397. The government agreed to the fair market
value after the permit denial ($13,725.50) on its motion for summary judgment
but changed its position prior to oral argument on Loveladies' cross motion. Id.
at 397 n.14. The government based its new value on the one acre of upland
which, the government argued, could be accessed through the wetlands. Id. at
397 n.15.
177. Id. at 399.
178. Id. The Claims Court stated that "if the plaintiffs are able to prove that
the land must remain an empty lot, plaintiffs will prevail at trial. On the other
hand, if plaintiffs cannot prove that the land is without significant remaining
commercial or recreational use, plaintiff's claim will have to be denied." Id.
179. See Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, supranote 144, at 13-17. See
also Lee R. Epstein, Takings and Wetlands in the Claims Courts: FloridaRock
and Loveladies Harbor,20 ENvTL. L. REP. 10517 (1990) (analyzing the government's arguments in both Loveladies and FloridaRock).
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lot to insure neighboring property owners unobstructed views.' 80
The Claims Court dismissed the proposed uses as "unsupported
contentions," which did not establish a market for any of the particular uses."8 1 Loveladies convinced the court that the only use of the
land after the denial of the permit was for conservation or recreational purposes with a value of $1,000 per acre. 182 Based on this, the
court compared the fair market value before 8 3 and after'8 4 the permit denial and determined that a 99% diminution in value resulted. 85 Thus, the Claims Court ruled that the Corps' rejection of
the section 404 permit denied Loveladies all economically viable use
of the 12.5 acres, 8 6 and therefore awarded Loveladies just compensation in the amount of $2,658,000 or $212,552 per acre.18 7
B. Analysis of the Decisions in Florida Rock and Loveladies
The problems with the decisions in Loveladies and Florida
Rock are rooted in the Claims Court's analysis of whether the permit denial denied the plaintiffs all "economically viable use" of
their land.1 8s The traditional takings analysis focuses on the following factors: the economic impact of the regulation, the character
180. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158-59 (1990)
appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991). See also Defendant's
Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 144, at 15.
181. Loveladies, 21 CI. Ct. at 159. The court gave several reasons why the
government's proposed uses were not feasible. First, farming salt hay was not
feasible because the lot was too small and inaccessible. Id. at 158-59. Second,
the proposed marina would cause problems with water quality and the dwindling shellfish community in the area. Id. at 158. Third, a mitigation site was
not a common possibility at the time of the permit denial. Id. at 159. Lastly, the
neighbors were not likely to buy the lot to preserve their view when the government had already done so through its denial of Loveladies' permit. Id. See also
Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 142, at 10-14 (describing potential uses for the land).
182. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 158.
183. Id. at 157. The court agreed with Loveladies' real estate experts and
found that the fair market value before the permit denial was $3,720,000 less
$900,500 for preparing the 12.5 acres for development and approximately
$161,500 to acquire a mitigation site as conditioned by the state permit. Id. at
156.
184. See id. at 158.
185. Id. at 160.
186. Id. at 161.
187. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 162. See supra notes 141-186 and accompanying
text for an explanation of Loveladies.
188. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). In Agins, the
Court stated that a regulation effects a taking if the regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate states interests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id.
In both Loveladies and FloridaRock, the Claims Court stated that the first
part of the Agins test is not at issue in these cases. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381,388 (1988), summary judgment denied, 21 Cl. Ct.
153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991); See also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied,

19921

Our Nation's Wetlands

of the government action, and the interference with investmentbacked expectations. 89 The Claims Court in both cases analyzed
the effect of the economic impact and the character of government
action in ways that are sure to encourage the filing of takings claims
and increase the likelihood of their success. Therefore, the decisions in both Loveladies and FloridaRock should be reversed by the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
The first factor, the economic impact of the regulation, focuses
on the property unit in question, comparing the unit's fair market
value before and after the permit denial to determine its diminution in value. 19° In both Loveladies and FloridaRock, the Claims
Court's determination of the regulation's economic impact was
problematic, and in turn, led to inflated diminutions in value. The
problem in Loveladies was the Claims Court's definition of the
property unit. In FloridaRock, the flaw was in the court's fair market value analysis.
The battle over what constitutes the property unit is of critical
importance to both sides in a takings claim and is often determinative of the outcome. 191 From a plaintiff's perspective, the most desirable property unit is one which consists solely of land which is
valuable only if a permit is granted. Therefore, if a permit is denied, the plaintiff can easily show a large diminution in value because the land has little use without the permit. The government
wants the court to include that any developable "upland" in the
property unit would retain a high market value even after premit
denial, which would reduce the diminution in value and be evidence
of the existence of an economically viable use of the land after the
L92
permit was denied.
In Loveladies, the government argued that the proper unit of
land to be considered in the court's analysis was the 250-acre parcel
that Loveladies originally purchased.19 3 The government's theory
was that Loveladies made millions of dollars developing and selling
nearly 200 acres of the parcel. Therefore, if included in the property unit, the high value of the 200 acres before and after the permit
497 U.S. 1053 (1987), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 915156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
189. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
For a discussion of Penn Central, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
190. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497

(1987).
191. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. "Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the
value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is determining
how to define the unit of property." Id. See also Ciampitti v. United States, 22
Cl. Ct. 310, 318-319 (1991).
192. See MALONE, supra note 23, § 14.03[2].
193. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392.
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denial would lead to only a minor diminution in value of the property unit. 19 4 The government offered into evidence development
plans that showed that the 12.5 acres for which the permit was denied were included with the 250 acres as one planned development. 195 The government argued that, at the very least, the 12.5
acres was a part of the approximately 50 acres which remained unsold at the time of the permit denial. 196
Loveladies, on the other hand, argued that the 200 acres were
developed prior to regulation and that the 12.5 acres were a separate parcel at the time they were subject to regulation under section
404.197 The Claims Court agreed with Loveladies and ruled that the
proper unit of property for the takings analysis was 12.5 acres. 198
While the Claims Court ruled for Loveladies in determining
the property unit to be 12.5 acres, there is support in the Supreme
Court's decisions for the government's position.199 In Penn Central,
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of determining the property
unit in a takings case, stating that a parcel of land is not divided into
separate parcels but rather viewed as a whole.2 °° In 1987, the Court
reiterated this idea in Keystone, ruling that the Subsistence Act in
Pennsylvania did not constitute a taking of the plaintiff's coal
mine.201 In Keystone, the Court cited Penn Central and ruled that
in determining the scope of the property unit, 27 million tons of coal
that was not affected by the regulation had to be considered along
with the coal which was affected by the regulation. 20 2 The Court
stated that the land could not be separated into parcels for the purpose of a takings claim.203 Similarly in Loveladies, the 200 acres not
194. Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 144, at 19.
195. Id.

196. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392-93.
197. See Second Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Plaintiff's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment-Issue Raised in Keystone Bituminous Coal

Ass'n v. DeBenedictis at 12, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct.
381, 383 (1988) (No. 243-83L), summary judgment denied,21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990),
appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
198. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 393.
199. See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
200. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 130-31. Support for the government's position
comes from the following quote from Penn Central:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been zntirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses on the character of the
action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a

whole.
Id. at 130-31.
201. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506.

202. Id. at 498.
203. Id.
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affected by the regulation, but part of the original parcel, should
have been considered as a whole with the 12.5 acres affected by the
regulation.2°
Other Claims Court cases also support the government's position in Loveladies. In Deltona Corporationv. United States,20 5 Deltona purchased 10,000 acres on Marco Island, Florida. 2° 6 The
property was divided into five tracts which were all part of a
"master plan" for residential development. 20 7 Two of the tracts of
land received dredge and fill permits under the Rivers and Harbors
Act. 208 The permits for the remaining three tracts of land fell
under the then newly adopted section 404.209 The Corps denied two
of the permits.2 10 Deltona then filed suit seeking compensation,
claiming that the Corps had taken the land by denying it section 404
permits.2 " The Claims Court ruled that when taken as a whole,
the two tracts of land contained only 20% of the 10,000 acres
purchased and only 33% of the lots that could be developed.2' 2
Therefore, the court ruled that the 10,000-acre parcel of land was
worth a substantial amount regardless of the permit denial on a
21 3
portion of the overall development.
Similarly, in Loveladies, the 12.5 acres should have been considered as a part of the 250-acre unit for the Claims Court's determination of the market value after the permit denial. As in Deltona,the
acreage applied for in the section 404 permit application was part of
a larger parcel of land purchased at one time and part of an overall
development plan encompassing the entire parcel of land.2 14 If the
250 acres had been viewed as a whole by the Claims Court, the diminution in value of the 12.5 acres would have been negligible in the
overall property value and a taking would not have occurred.
Therefore, according to Supreme Court and Claims Court precedents, the court in Loveladies did not determine the proper unit of
204. See Defendant's Supplemental Brief on the Supreme Court's Decision
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictisat 9, Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 383 (1988) (No. 243-83L), summary judgment
denied, 21 Cl.

Ct 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15,

1991) [hereinafter Government's Supplemental Brief].
205. 657 F.2d 1184 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
206. Id. at 1188.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1188-89.
210. Id. at 1189.

211. Id.
212. Id. at 1192.
213. Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192. See also Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d
1210, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1981) (ruling that denial of a permit for 60 acres of a 120
acre tract was not a taking when the value of the land as a whole was taken into
account), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
214. Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 144, at 19.
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land for the takings analysis. This error led to the finding of an
exaggerated diminution in value and the Claims Court wrongly
awarded the developer over two million dollars as "just
compensation."
The Claims Court's analysis of the property unit in Loveladies
poses various problems for the section 404 program. After Loveladies, a developer is now encouraged to divide his property into parcels and file a permit application for a parcel of land consisting
entirely of wetlands. Thus, absent valuable uplands to raise the
market value, it would be easy to prove a large diminution in value
in the event of a permit denial and in anticipation of a claim for just
compensation. In addition, a developer may find it advantageous to
wait until the later stages of a development project before applying
for a fill permit for the wetlands acreage. Thereby, the already developed parcels could be sold off prior to the permit denial. According to Loveladies, the high value of the developed land would not be
figured into the diminution in value because the developed land
would not be considered part of the property unit. As seen in the
decisions in Loveladies and Florida Rock, a large diminution in
value may make a takings claim successful. Thus, the Claims
Court's ruling in Loveladies regarding what acreage was to be considered as part of the property unit is not only inconsistent with
past decisions but encourages manipulation of the property unit in
future takings claims.
In florida Rock, the Claims Court promoted more problems
with its decision regarding determination of whether any economically viable use remained in the land after the section 404 permit
denial. The problems stem from the court's determination of fair
market value after the permit denial. The Claims Court wrongly
applied the issue of speculation as a limiting factor on the government's presentation of evidence regarding the existence of a post
denial fair market value.
The Claims Court's original decision in FNorida Rock was vacated on appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the Claims Court misapplied the fair market analysis. 215 The
Claims Court focused on the requirement that potential buyers
must be knowledgeable in the determination of fair market
value. 216 The court excluded evidence presented by the government regarding the existence of a post-denial fair market made up
215. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert.denied, 497 U.S. 1053 (1987), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), appealdocketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
216. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 167 (1985), aff'd
in part and vacated in part,791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1053 (1987). See also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 170-172
(1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
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of knowledgeable buyers. 217 The Claims Court reasoned that there
will always be speculators who will gamble on the potential appreciation of property, but this may only reflect those who have been
deceived by unscrupulous promoters. 218 This type of speculation,
the Claims Court stated, is not dispositive of the existence of a fair
market made up of knowledgeable buyers. 2 19
The Federal Circuit stated that the Claims Court was clearly
wrong in excluding evidence regarding the existence of those willing to buy the property and hold onto it in hopes that the regulation
would change. 2 20 The Federal Circuit stated that these buyers may
be called speculators, but that does not mean they are not knowledgeable. 221 Further, the Federal Circuit cited people who buy
property, gambling on the existence of finding mineral deposits on
the property as an example of knowledgeable buyers. 2 22 The appellate court remanded the case, stating that the evidence of the existence of a fair market value based on speculation should be heard. s
On remand, the Claims Court allowed the government's testimony regarding the existence of a fair market value after the permit denial, but the court applied the same logic it had in its earlier
decision to discount the credibility of the evidence. 2 24 The court
stated that "fair market values are premised on transactions between knowledgeable parties... and.., defendant's failure to provide evidence of the purchaser's knowledge renders its testimony
unpersuasive." 22 5 The court admitted that in arms-length transactions, knowledge of all restrictions is usually presumed. 226 But the
court again stated that the government's evidence of fair market
value was based on speculation as its highest and best use and this
use did not overcome the requirement that the market value must
227
be based on a market made up of knowledgeable buyers.
In Florda Rock, the government presented a real estate expert's testimony that a fair market value of at least $4,000 per acre
existed for the property after the permit was denied. 2 The president of Florida Rock even testified that he refused offers from real
217. See FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 174.
218. FloridaRock, 8 Cl. Ct. at 167.
219. Id. The Claims Court expressed a concern for naive investors being
deceived in the fast-paced Florida real estate market. Id.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

FloridaRock, 791 F.2d at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FloridaRock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 170-74.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.

228. Id. at 172; see also Defendant's Proposed Findings and Conclusions,

supra note 81, at 18.
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estate investors interested in buying the property after the permit
denial.229 The Federal Circuit found this convincing evidence of the
existence of knowledgeable buyers, especially because the property
was not listed on the market. 2 0 The company president further
testified that "he considered the property to be worth in excess of
$10,000 per acre, even after the Corps denied a permit on the
23 1
property.)
Despite this extensive evidence of a fair market value of at
least $4,000 per acre after the permit denial, the Claims Court refused to consider the evidence. 23 2 Even with the Federal Circuit's
guidance, the Claims Court did not grasp the idea that knowledgeable buyers could be aware of the regulations involved and still speculate. Knowledgeable investors speculate every day on land which
is restricted in its use, either gambling on receiving approval or hoping someday that a regulation will change. If the Claims Court's
view prevails, plaintiffs will have to do little more than attack the
government's valuations on the grounds that no one who was
knowledgeable would invest in property which was subject to
regulation.
While the Claims Court in Loveladies and FloridaRock had different problems in determining the effect of the economic impact of
the regulation, the courts in both cases agreed that the character of
the government action was such that the "nuisance exception"
should not be extended to these cases. In both FloridaRock and
Loveladies the government argued for the extension of the nuisance exception on two related fronts. First, the government argued that the pollution caused by the proposed activities in each
case should be abated, consistent with the goals of the CWA to prevent harm to water quality.2 3 Second, the government argued that
section 404 protection of wetlands should be exempt from takings
claims because it protected valuable public resources.2
In both decisions, the Claims Court expressed a dislike for the
concept of the nuisance exception. On remand in FloridaRock, the
Claims Court blamed the government for obscuring the real question in the case by using the nuisance exception argument. 235 Furthermore, in the first Claims Court decision in Florida Rock, the
court reflected its disapproval for the theory by stating that "[t]he
compensation clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment would be read out
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of existence if government could define away private property
rights by pronouncing their exercise as contrary to the public
2 36
welfare."
The plaintiffs in both cases successfully argued that the Claims
Court should review the level of pollution in terms of classic nuisance analysis. In both Florida Rock and Loveladies, the Claims
Court stated that the pollution caused by the activities did not reach
the level of a nuisance necessary to be exempt from a claim for just
7
compensation.2
Alternatively, the government argued that protection of a natural resource as valuable as wetlands was a government action
which should be afforded protection from takings claims.2 5 The
Claims Court failed to even address the issue in the final decisions,
instead dismissing the nuisance exception argument based on the
level of pollution.3 9 However, the government was correct in relying on the nuisance exception and had support in Keystone. In Keystone, the Court considered a regulation on coal mining exempt
from a takings claim because it was in the public interest,2 4 0 even
though coal mining was not considered a public nuisance by the
241
state.
The protection of wetlands is in the public interest.M Wetlands are recognized as an extremely valuable natural resource
which have benefits beyond aesthetics, including flood control, improved water quality, and the protection of wildlife. 243 Wetlands
are being lost at an alarming rate2 44 and regulation is the key to
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protecting the wetlands.
Denying a nuisance exception theory and allowing takings
claims by owners of wetlands undermines the necessary regulations
because the money paid to the property owners becomes unavailable for conservation. Additionally, recoveries under takings claims
encourage investors to buy and develop wetlands which are being
destroyed at a record pace. Thus, section 404 regulation should be
protected from takings claims because the large awards of just compensation will eventually undermine the effectiveness of the regulation. Section 404 of the CWA is a mandate from Congress that the
protection of wetlands is within the public interest. 245 The Claims
Court ignored this Congressional mandate in its decisions. In the
future, the Claims Court should reevaluate the nuisance exception
and extend it to protect the future of section 404 and the wetlands.
I.

CONCLUSION

In FloridaRock and Loveladies, the decisions handed down by
the United States Claims Court have serious problems in their analysis of the takings issue. In both cases, the problems were determinative and led to findings that a taking had occurred which required
the government to pay millions of dollars in just compensation.
The decisions were flawed in their determination of what constitutes a property unit, and what is the fair market value. These decisions should be reversed on appeal.
However, if upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the rulings in Loveladies and FloridaRock will
reflect a disturbing trend to those who see section 404 as the savior
of our nation's dwindling wetlands. 2A6 The approaches taken by the
Claims Court in these cases have increased the likelihood of takings
challenges, and based on their success and size of their judgments,
have possibly dealt a final blow to section 404 in its present form.247
The takings analysis represents the struggle between property
rights and government's ability to regulate them. These cases appear to be representative of the growing trend that has surfaced in
the Supreme Court, 248 the White House, 24 9 and in Congress,25° that
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seems ready to take constitutional law of property rights forward into

the past. If this were to happen, constitutional property rights would take
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property rights are again gaining strength at the expense of the government. Along with this trend could go the remainder of a valuable natural resource, our dwindling wetlands.
John K DeVine

away the police power on an unprecedented scale, and the nation would
end up with a new constitutional regime of laissez faire. This potential development might be what the regulatory takings is all about.
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